FEATURE ARTICLE:
KEY ISSUES FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN 2005:?CABLE

CABLE PRIMER: LOCAL AUTHORITY OVER CABLE SYSTEMS

HOT CABLE FRANCHISING ISSUES

Scope of Authority Over Internet [Cable Modem] Services

The cable modem debate involves at least two distinct issues. The first issue is: what is the proper classification of the service? The Federal Communications Commission issued a declaratory order finding that cable modem service is not a cable service but is instead an interstate information service. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52, (released Mar. 15, 2002). The 9th Circuit in Brand X Internet Services v. F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir., 2003) affirmed the FCC's finding that cable modem service is not a cable service, but reversed the FCC with respect to its finding that cable modem service is not a telecommunications service. In the 9th Circuit's view, cable modem service is a telecommunications service.

The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by the cable industry and by the FCC and the United States to address whether cable modem service is a telecommunications service or an information service. F.C.C. v. Brand X Internet Services, 2004 WL 2153536 (December 3, 2004). The Court denied a petition for certiorari filed by local governments. Presumably, this means that the Court will either (a) decide cable modem service is a telecommunications service or an information service; or (b) remand the matter back to the 9th Circuit for further consideration.

The second issue: what is the effect of the classification? The text of the Ninth Circuit?s decision suggests that the appeals court believed cable operators providing cable modem service should be subject to the same common carriage rules as apply to telephone companies providing Internet services. The text may also be read to imply that cable modem service would be subject to the same franchising, fee and tax rules that apply to other telecommunications services. The logic of the decision ? if upheld and if the FCC does not grant other regulatory relief to the cable industry ? would open cable networks to competitive service providers at least for purposes of the provision of Internet service. And it would subject cable modem service to certain universal service fund federal fees.

On the other hand, the cable industry may not be better off if cable modem service is classified as an information service. As will be discussed in a future article, some telephone companies appear to intend to use the ?information services? model to escape traditional telephone regulation and to escape cable regulation when providing cable services. The traditional distinction between "cable services" and "telecommunications services" is not sustainable if the FCC persists in creating a new class of "information services" which require neither federal nor local authorization.

Based upon the FCC?s determination, cable operators also acted uniformly across the nation and refused to pay franchise fees on cable modem service, even where the franchise explicitly required such payments. The operators claimed that the franchise fee is limited to 5% of the gross revenues derived from the operation of the cable system "to provide cable service." The operators claimed that because the FCC declared that cable modem service is not a cable service, it would be illegal to pay a franchise fee on cable modem service. This argument, as discussed above, is based on the 1996 change in the language of the Cable Act?s franchise fee provision. More generally, operators have argued that localities are prohibited from imposing any requirements related in any respect to cable modem service. In fact, as discussed above, the FCC has an ongoing rulemaking under way to decide what effect, if any, its decision has on the authority of local governments to charge a franchise fee on cable modem service based on state or local law requirements (as opposed to the Cable Act?s franchise fee provision). The FCC is also considering whether localities may otherwise regulate the provision of cable modem service, or require facilities and equipment related to the provision of cable modem service. In addition, it is far from obvious (a) whether the 1996 amendments affect local authority to collect the full franchise fee negotiated under pre-1996 agreements, or (b) whether the 1996 amendments affect local authority to collect a fee on cable modem service where the franchise requires a fee less than the 5% federal maximum.

Several communities brought suit against their cable franchisees in late 2002 and 2003, claiming that fees were owed on cable modem revenues based on the franchise agreements with the City. Most notable is a case involving the City of Chicago. Chicago cable franchises require payment of franchise fees on cable modem services. A federal district court ruled that payment of franchise fees on cable modem services was prohibited by federal law. City of Chicago v. AT&T Broadband, Inc., No. 02 C 7517, 2003 WL 22057905 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2003). The district court?s decision was vacated in City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 384 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2004). Chicago had originally filed suit in state court based on the language of (what is now) the Comcast franchise. The case was removed to the federal district court, and the district court issued its decision on the merits. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the case should never have been heard by the district court because it did not involve a federal question. According to the Court, the Cable Act could be raised as a defense against the enforcement of what would otherwise be an illegal franchise fee provision; but the source of local authority to charge the fee was state, not federal law, and as a result the case was not in and of itself based on federal law. The case now returns to state court, where the City will again be able to present its contract claims, and Comcast, presumably, will again argue that the claims have been preempted. The Seventh Circuit's view of the case is significant. If compensation for use of the rights-of-way is primarily a state claim on a contract, then FCC preemption of the classification of the services for regulatory purposes will not control the ultimate authority of local governments to charge franchise fees for the services.

When Must a Company Apply For a Franchise?

Several communities are now watching as telephone companies install facilities that they intend to use to provide cable service (either as a cable operator, or as an open video system). Some telephone companies claim to be installing the facilities under the certificate received from the state to construct telephone lines (the companies argue that the same facilities would be installed even if they did not plan to offer video services). And, they argue the Cable Act does not require the telephone company to obtain a franchise until the company actually begins to offer cable service. Under this approach, build-out of a new telephone company network occurs without the normal protections and community planning of the cable franchising process.

It is far from obvious that the telephone industry's position is correct. Under federal law, it is illegal for a cable operator to provide cable service without a franchise, 47 U.S.C. ? 541(b)(1). But that does not mean that federal law assumes franchises will issue after, rather than before construction starts. A franchise is defined as an ?authorization? ?which authorizes the construction or operation of a cable system.? 47 U.S.C. ? 522(9). (emphasis supplied). There is thus a good argument that localities are entitled to require a franchise before construction begins. Indeed, some obligations imposed on local governments under the Cable Act ? including the duty to prevent redlining ? may be much more difficult to satisfy post-construction. Yet for now, franchise-less construction is proceeding in many communities.

How Should Cities Regulate in a More Competitive Environment?

Cable service remains a monopoly service in most communities. However, most communities are beginning to face questions that arise as new companies seek the opportunity to begin to provide competitive cable services; as cable companies begin to provide advanced cable services; and as cable companies begin to enter non-cable markets. For example, some communities have inserted provisions in cable ordinances that allow for suspension of certain requirements once two cable companies begin to compete head-to-head throughout the community (the franchise for Tacoma, Washington provides an example of this approach). Some communities are beginning to focus exclusively on rights-of-way management and related problems, establishing generic requirements that apply to all users of the rights-of-way (for example, some cities are adopting cable franchise and OVS ordinances simultaneously). And some communities are beginning to consider how to review and audit franchise fee payments under circumstances where an operator may be providing a bundle of services ? telephone, Internet and cable service ? for a consolidated price. Is the entire package subject to a fee? Or only a portion of it?

The Cable Act allows localities to charge a franchise fee, but states that the franchise fee ?shall not exceed 5 percent of such cable operator's gross revenues derived...from the operation of the cable system to provide cable services.? The Act does not require fees to be based on gross revenues derived from the provision of cable service. Theoretically, a fee could be a ?per foot? charge for rights-of-way, or an other measure of right, so long as the amount collected by the locality does not exceed 5% of cable service-related revenue. In Parish of Jefferson v. Cox Communications Louisiana, LLC, No. CIV.A. 02-3344, 2003 WL 21634440 (E.D. La. Jul. 3, 2003), the franchise agreement required fees on cable modem and telecommunications services, but also incorporated references to changes in law. The court found the franchise agreement endorsed the FCC reclassification of cable modem service as an information service, and thus, the cable modem franchise fee requirement could not be enforced. Another suit was filed in the City of Rochester. The case was removed to federal court, and then remanded back to state court for reasons similar to those adopted by the Seventh Circuit. City of Rochester v. Time Warner Cable, 6:02-cv-06526 (W.D.N.Y. April 24, 2003). However, in a separate proceeding, Time Warner subsequently filed a separate 42 U.S.C. ??1983 action against the City. The Rochester court federal judge then consolidated Time Warner?s state and federal cases in federal district court. On December 22, 2003, the district court granted Time Warner's motion for summary judgment, finding that cable modem is not cable service, and further enjoining Rochester from collecting any fees on any service other than Time Warner's provision of ?cable service.? Time Warner Cable v. City of Rochester, No. 6:03-cv-06257-DGL (W.D.N.Y. 2003). The latest decision in the Rochester dispute issued on November 3, 2004 is Time Warner Cable-Rochester v. City Of Rochester, 342 F.Supp.2d 143 (W.D.N.Y.,2004). Time Warner, having brought suit under ? 1983, and having prevailed, asked the court to award attorneys fees under ?1988. The district court concluded that attorneys fees were not available: ?Section 1983 may provide a cable company with a cause of action to enforce its rights under the Act, but that does not automatically mean that all ? 1983 remedies-attorney's fees in particular-are available in such an action...[I]t is not reasonable to assume that "any time Congress creates a right that is enforceable against state or local officials or agencies, section 1983, and its companion, section 1988, come in the door and the American rule [that parties to a lawsuit generally pay their own attorney's fees, regardless of who prevails in the lawsuit] goes out the window..." There is no evidence that Congress intended to make attorney's fee awards available in an action under the Communications Act, nor would such awards help implement the Act or further its purposes.? It is likewise much more difficult for a locality to establish and enforce effective PEG and I-Net obligations post-construction. For example, in order to program PEG channels easily, a physical link is often necessary between a PEG production facility and the headend of a cable operator. Unless that link is designed as part of the initial construction plans for a telco system, it may be much more difficult and expensive to program the PEG channels on the telco-owned system. Until a connection is established, it is impossible to do any live programming, such as carriage of City Council meetings.

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